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JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND LAWYERS’ ROLES
Samuel J. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the rich scholarly literature debating the proper roles
of lawyers and the precise contours of lawyers’ ethical conduct, as a descriptive matter, the American legal system operates as an adversarial system, premised in part upon clear demarcations between the functions of different
lawyers within the system. Broadly speaking, prosecutors have the distinct
role of serving justice, which includes the duty to try to convict criminal
defendants who are deserving of punishment, in a way that is consistent with
both substantive and procedural justice.1 In contrast, private attorneys have
a duty to zealously represent the best interests of their clients,2 within ethical
bounds, but without taking into account broader notions of pursuing a just
outcome. In some ways, criminal defense attorneys have a greater license or
duty to engage in zealous representation of the interests of their clients, permitting or requiring them to use tactics that are questionable or prohibited
for other private attorneys.3
© 2015 Samuel J. Levine. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. I was
first introduced to Bob Rodes and his scholarship through my friendship with another
towering figure at Notre Dame Law School, Tom Shaffer. I am honored to participate in
this tribute to Bob’s memory, and I would also like to take this opportunity to express my
admiration for Tom and his work, as well as my appreciation for Rick Garnett, who
continues to follow in their ethical and scholarly tradition. An earlier version of this Essay
was presented at the Criminal Justice Ethics Shmooze at Fordham Law School.
1 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1337 (2004).
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2014) (“A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client’s behalf.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1982) (“A
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”).
3 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 1, at 1344–45 nn.18–27; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2014) (prohibiting lawyers from presenting a frivolous claim or
contention, but noting that the rule is “subordinate to federal or state constitutional law
1989
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This Essay considers the rhetoric some judges have used to characterize
the respective duties of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. The
Essay suggests that, although this rhetoric often expresses admirable aspirations and ideals, it improperly blurs the lines between the roles different lawyers play within the adversarial system. Specifically, these judges have used
language that would seem to place additional limitations on both the methods prosecutors employ in seeking to obtain just convictions and the tactics
criminal defense attorneys employ in zealous advocacy of their clients’ interests. This Essay concludes that judges should avoid such rhetoric, which has
the potential to undermine basic principles of the American legal system.
I.
A.
1.

PROSECUTORS

Maloney and Its Precursors

Maloney

In a highly publicized and widely praised 2014 decision, United States v.
Maloney,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the defendant’s conviction on the basis of the prosecutor’s improper summation. The path toward reversal was unusual: after the appellate court initially
affirmed the conviction, the court heard an appeal en banc, following which
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California filed a
Motion to Summarily Reverse the Conviction, Vacate the Sentence and
Remand to the District Court.5 In addition to concluding that the comments
made during closing argument constituted reversible error, the U.S. Attorney
informed the court of the office’s plans to have attorneys view the video of
the argument “as a training tool to reinforce the principle that all Assistant
U.S. Attorneys must be aware of the rules pertaining to closing argument and
must make every effort to stay well within these rules.”6
In commending the U.S. Attorney, the court cited a segment of one of
the most eloquent and well-known statements from the United States
Supreme Court regarding the unique role of prosecutors in the American
legal system:
A prosecutor is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.7

The Ninth Circuit also quoted a more contemporary statement, from a
1993 opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski, who joined in the court’s opinion in
that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a
claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule”).
4 755 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014).
5 Id. at 1046.
6 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Maloney: “The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but to win fairly, staying well
within the rules.”8 Judge Kozinski’s attractive assertion that the prosecutor
should “stay[ ] well within the rules” has been cited in nearly two dozen cases,
and not surprisingly—perhaps strategically—the U.S. Attorney in Maloney
used this phrase as an indication of the good will the office now exhibits, in
acknowledging the wrongfulness of both the summation and its own initial
failure to concede error on appeal.9 In addition, the U.S. Attorney aimed to
signal the office’s determination not to engage in such misconduct in the
future, by instilling in its attorneys a recognition of the importance of
remaining “well within the rules.”
Upon closer examination, however, while the Ninth Circuit was presumably correct in commending the U.S. Attorney’s willingness to admit error
and deter future misconduct, the court’s broad rhetoric may raise questions
of its own. Specifically, it may not be clear either that, as a doctrinal matter,
prosecutors should be expected to remain “well” within the bounds of ethical
conduct, or that the quotation from the Supreme Court supports such a
contention.
2.

Berger

It may first be useful to look at the quotation from the United States
Supreme Court in its entirety. In Berger v. United States, Justice Sutherland
wrote:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.10

Notably, from this entire statement, the court in Maloney cited—almost
selectively—only the first part, emphasizing that the prosecutor’s interest is
in serving justice, not in winning.11 It is undoubtedly correct that when the
prosecutor is faced with the choice between “winning” and serving justice,
justice prevails; this choice, however, is not the norm for most prosecutors in
most cases. Instead, as Justice Sutherland continued, the goal—therefore the
8 Id. (quoting United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9 See id.
10 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
11 Maloney, 755 F.3d at 1046.
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role—of a prosecutor is typically to convict a defendant in a way that is consistent with the duty to serve justice.12
In fact, while Justice Sutherland’s statement is often celebrated for its
timeless and cogent reminder that prosecutors have a duty to avoid wrongful
motives and tactics, his discussion operates from the premise that prosecutors
clearly “should” prosecute with “earnestness and vigor” and “use every legitimate means to bring about a just [conviction].”13 In short, though Justice
Sutherland rightfully insisted that the prosecutor aim to make sure that innocence should not suffer, he made clear that the prosecutor’s “twofold” aim
also includes the interest that guilt should not escape.14
Given this balance in the prosecutor’s role, although it is likewise clear
that the prosecutor should stay within ethical bounds, it may not be clear, as
Judge Kozinski declared, that the prosecutor should stay “well” within ethical
rules, in a way that might weaken the chances of obtaining a proper conviction.15 That is, if the duty to serve justice includes the duty to ensure that
guilt not escape, it would seem unjust for the prosecutor to risk a proper
conviction by refraining from using a tactic that is within the rules but not
“well” within the rules.16
12 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993).
16 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (“Prosecutors need not be
entirely ‘neutral and detached.’ In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to
be zealous in their enforcement of the law.” (citation omitted)); Wright v. United States,
732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) (“If honestly convinced of the defendant’s guilt, the
prosecutor is free, indeed obliged, to be deeply interested in urging that view by any fair
means.”); cf. Green, supra note 1, at 642–43 (describing the “traditional understanding” of
the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice). Green writes:
[A] prosecutor is a representative of, as well as a lawyer for, a government entity
that has several different, sometimes seemingly inconsistent, objectives in the
criminal context. Of these, convicting and punishing lawbreakers is only one,
and it is no more important than others, such as avoiding the punishment of
innocent people and ensuring that people are treated fairly. As the government’s
surrogate, the prosecutor’s job is to carry out all these objectives and resolve the
tension among them.
. . . This is also the understanding to which prosecutors should be more
receptive, since it does not imply that they should “pull their punches” or otherwise act to level the playing field between themselves and the defense. On the
contrary, it encourages their instinct to do battle. It implies, however, that prosecutors must not only battle lawbreakers, in furtherance of the government’s
objective of convicting the lawless. Additionally, prosecutors must resist various
forces that would undermine the government’s other aims.
Id. at 642; see also Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L.
BULL. 126, 129–30 (1988) (“A prosecutor is not supposed to be neutral and detached. It is
not the prosecutor’s duty to present both sides of a criminal case. Nor is it the prosecutor’s
duty to urge the jury to draw inferences in favor of the defendant.”); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45, 52 (1991) (“[A] noncompetitive approach to prosecutorial ethics is inconsistent with
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Kojayan

Taking this examination one step further, it may be helpful to look at
the source of the “well within the rules” formulation: Judge Kozinski’s opinion in United States v. Kojayan.
Judge Kozinski wrote:
Prosecutors are subject to constraints and responsibilities that don’t
apply to other lawyers. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed, must—do everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first. The
prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the
rules. See United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 458 (9th Cir. 1991); Barbara
Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1141 (1982). As Justice Douglas once
warned, “[t]he function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is
not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to
vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused
of crime a fair trial.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, [416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)].17

The first and third sentences of this paragraph seem beyond dispute,
almost unremarkable in the context of prosecutorial ethics: of course the
prosecutor is subject to unique constraints and responsibilities—it does not
seem necessary to cite Berger for this proposition—and of course the prosecutor’s duty is to vindicate the rights of the people, not to “tack [the] skins of
victims.”18
The middle sentence is less obvious. Judge Kozinski contrasts the
license—and duty—of private attorneys to “do everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests” with the prosecutor’s primary duty to
“serve truth and justice first.”19 As in Maloney, the opinion paints a somewhat
false dichotomy between the interests of the prosecutor and the interests of
truth and justice. Apparently, the implication is that at times, the prosecutor
will have an “interest” that differs from a true and just outcome. To the
extent that such a conflict arises, it is again obvious that the prosecutor must
choose justice. Furthermore, it is likewise obvious that the duty to serve justice includes safeguarding both substantive and procedural justice, obligating
the prosecutor to abide by ethical rules. Again, though, it does not follow
that the prosecutor must stay “well” within ethical rules, if such restraint lessens the likelihood of a proper conviction.
the professional codes’ underlying theory. . . . [The codes] do not exempt prosecutors
from the requirements of zealous advocacy. . . . [T]he codes signal that prosecutors can
achieve justice while operating within the adversary system’s rules. . . . [A]dvocates are
meant to do their best. To the extent prosecutors temper advocacy . . . they call into
question the essential assumptions of the very system the rules codify.”).
17 Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1323.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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It may therefore be instructive to look at the source Judge Kozinski cited
in support of the “well within the rules” locution: the Ninth Circuit case
United States v. Hill.20
4.

Hill

As it turns out, Hill does not appear to provide support for Judge Kozinski’s oft-cited articulation of the prosecutor’s duty to stay “well” within the
rules. Instead, Hill involved a case in which the government offered into
evidence statements that the Ninth Circuit held inadmissible. In concluding
that “[t]he government should not have offered this evidence,” the Ninth
Circuit found it important to “remind the government’s trial counsel and his
superior of the basic duty of counsel for the government.”21 Thus, the court
quoted, in its entirety, Justice Sutherland’s statement from Berger.22
Although it seems quite appropriate for the court to cite Justice Sutherland’s
admonition as a reminder to the government that it should not seek to offer
inadmissible evidence, once again it does not follow that prosecutors should
avoid tactics within the rules—but not “well” within the rules—that would
otherwise prove effective in helping to obtain a proper conviction.23
B.

Contrast Cases

To further illustrate the questionable value and accuracy of characterizing the prosecutor’s duty to serve justice as mandating that the prosecutor
stay “well” within the rules, it may be helpful to look at two contrast cases: a
somewhat contentious New York Court of Appeals case and a 2012 Ninth
Circuit case.
1.

Jones

In a widely discussed and sometimes criticized 1978 decision, People v.
Jones,24 the New York Court of Appeals considered the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations when, after plea negotiations had commenced, the prosecu20 953 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1991).
21 Id. at 458.
22 See id.
23 To the extent that the “well within the rules” standard might be intended as a prophylactic measure to prevent overzealous prosecution, the adoption of such a standard
remains problematic.
As a normative matter, whatever its intended goal, the “well within the rules” standard
incorporates an inaccurate, or imbalanced, depiction of the obligations of the prosecutor.
As a practical matter, holding prosecutors to a “well within the rules” standard may have a
chilling effect on otherwise appropriate and ethical efforts to achieve a conviction. Alternatively, placing arguably undue limitations on prosecutors beyond those mandated by
ethics rules may have the unintended result of undermining the credibility of other ethical
obligations. See Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at American
Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L.
REV. 165, 197–98 (2007).
24 375 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1978).
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tor learned of the death of the complaining witness. Without disclosing this
information to the defendant, the prosecutor continued to engage in plea
negotiations, culminating in the defendant’s decision to accept a guilty plea
rather than proceeding to trial.25 Upon learning that the complaining witness had died prior to the plea agreement, the defendant moved to withdraw
the guilty plea, arguing that the prosecution had been under an obligation to
disclose the fact of the complaining witness’s death.26
As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the prosecutor did not
violate the letter of the law that requires disclosure of exculpatory material.
As the court observed, “proof of the fact of the death of this witness . . . would
not have constituted exculpatory evidence,” and therefore information
regarding the death of the witness did not qualify as Brady material.27 In
fact, the court noted that defense counsel did not claim otherwise. Instead,
the defendant argued that “in the spirit of Brady versus Maryland,”28 the prosecution was under an obligation to disclose “information in its possession
which . . . is highly material to the practical, tactical considerations which
attend a determination to plead guilty, but not to the legal issue of guilt
itself.”29
The court quoted, at length, Justice Sutherland’s famous statement from
Berger. Moreover, the court noted “that the responsibilities of a prosecutor
for fairness and open-dealing are of a higher magnitude than those of a private litigant.”30 Nevertheless, rather than expecting the prosecutor to operate “well” within the rules, the court looked carefully at the “formal
statements of the professional responsibilities of prosecutors to make disclosure[,] [which] appear to address only the obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence”—not “tactical data”—and “the formulation of standards [that]
appear[ ] to consider only affirmative misrepresentation and possibly, by reasonable extension, misleading silence when there is an affirmative duty of
disclosure.”31 The court emphasized that “[t]he provision does not, however, assist in determining when there may be such an affirmative duty to
disclose.”32 Instead, the court concluded, “no prosecutor is obliged to share
his appraisal of the weaknesses of his own case (as opposed to specific exculpatory evidence) with defense counsel.”33
Thus, the court fully acknowledged that the prosecutor’s duty to serve
justice entails the obligation to stay within unique ethical rules, which
25 Id. at 42.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 43.
28 Id. at 42 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a further discussion of Jones and, more generally, distinctions between the
letter of the law and the spirit of the law in the context of legal ethics, see Samuel J. Levine,
The Law and “Spirit of the Law” in Legal Ethics, 2015 J. PROF. LAW. (forthcoming).
29 Jones, 375 N.E.2d at 43.
30 Id. at 44.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL508.txt

1996

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

10-JUL-15

14:49

[vol. 90:5

include responsibilities toward the defendant beyond those of private attorneys toward their adversaries. At the same time, the court emphasized the
prosecutor’s concomitant license—or duty—to obtain a proper conviction by
using tactics that are permissible within ethical rules, rather than weakening
the chances of a conviction by staying “well” within the rules and forgoing
tactical advantages.34 In fact, paraphrasing Berger in a way that derives a lesson very different from Judge Kozinski’s conclusion, the court declared that:
“A fundamental concern of the criminal justice system, of course, is that an
innocent defendant shall not be convicted; not that a possibly guilty actor
shall escape conviction because the People are not able to establish his
guilt.”35
2.

Lopez-Avila

In United States v. Lopez-Avila,36 a 2012 Ninth Circuit case decided by a
panel that did not include Judge Kozinski, in the course of describing the
prosecutor’s duty to serve justice, the court cited both Berger and Kojayan.37
However, the manner in which the court cited and paraphrased these cases
includes a subtle change from Judge Kozinski’s articulation in Kojayan, which
might also indicate a subtle difference in approach to the prosecutor’s duty:
The Department of Justice has an obligation to its lawyers and to the
public to prevent prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors, as servants of the
law, are subject to constraints and responsibilities that do not apply to other
lawyers; they must serve truth and justice first. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d
1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993). Their job is not just to win, but to win fairly,
staying within the rules. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.38

The first sentence that is followed by a citation to Kojayan is, in fact,
comprised of phrases taken from both Berger (“servant of the law”)39 and
Kojayan (“subject to constraints and responsibilities that don’t apply to other
lawyers”; and “serve truth and justice first”).40 Though it would be more
accurate to provide a citation to Berger for the “servant of the law” phrase, it
may not be surprising that, instead, the opinion offers a single citation—to
Kojayan—which is the source of most of the sentence.
It is surprising, though, that the court cited Berger following the next
sentence, which is quoted nearly verbatim from Kojayan, and which, though
similar in theme, does not appear in Justice Sutherland’s admonition in Ber34 The court’s approach in Jones might also differ from the Supreme Court’s in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976), that “the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure.” The approach in Agurs seems to favor—and possibly
require—staying “well” within disclosure obligations, even at the risk of providing the
defendant more information than mandated under the rules.
35 Jones, 375 N.E.2d at 44.
36 678 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012).
37 Id. at 964.
38 Id.
39 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
40 Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1323.
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ger. In addition, notably, the court omitted the word “well” in its description
of the prosecutor’s job, declaring only that the prosecutor must “stay[ ]
within the rules.”41 Perhaps the presence of both of these peculiarities in the
Lopez-Avila opinion is an indication that this Ninth Circuit panel did not
share Judge Kozinski’s view from Kojayan that the prosecutor should stay
“well” within the rules. Instead, the panel may have found the obligation to
stay merely “within” the rules to be more consistent with the balanced
approach to the prosecutorial role set forth in Berger.42
II.

CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

If prosecutors are unique in the degree to which their ethical obligations
include duties toward their adversaries, criminal defense attorneys stand out
in the degree to which their ethical obligations to their clients often trump
other duties. For example, criminal defense attorneys are expected to make
arguments, when effective, on the basis of false inferences and to cast doubt
on the credibility of truthful witnesses.43 Depending on the jurisdiction,
criminal defense attorneys may be expected to raise contentions that would
otherwise be considered frivolous, and they may be expected to allow their
clients to testify falsely.44
Although there is room for debate regarding the precise contours of
ethical conduct for criminal defense attorneys, whatever the justification, the
American criminal justice system accepts and often requires that criminal
defense attorneys engage in forms of advocacy that may be off-limits to other
private attorneys, let alone prosecutors.45 Nevertheless, along with common
public dissatisfaction with many of the tactics—or even the function—of lawyers who represent criminal defendants,46 there are sometimes calls from
within the legal academy and even the judiciary for more limited forms of
advocacy among criminal defense attorneys.47 At least one case illustrating
this approach provides nearly a mirror image to Judge Kozinski’s application
41 Id.
42 Indeed, the court demonstrated a similar balance in its reference to “Justice Sutherland’s famous statement that the dual obligation of a federal prosecutor in our justice
system is to strike hard blows but to refrain from striking foul ones; to use legitimate means
to attempt to secure a conviction without employing improper methods to do so.” LopezAvila, 678 F.3d at 964.
43 See Levine, supra note 1, at 1344–45.
44 See id. at 1344 n.19 (“[I]n some jurisdictions a criminal defense attorney is obligated
to accede to the wishes of a client who insists on testifying falsely.”); supra text accompanying note 3.
45 See Levine, supra note 1, at 1344 (noting that a prosecutor’s ethical obligations differ from those of most lawyers because of the prosecutor’s “duty of truth”).
46 See, e.g., HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013); Jed S. Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1990,
at 3.
47 See, e.g., Symposium, Limitations on the Effectiveness of Criminal Defense Counsel: Legitimate Means or “Chilling Wedges?,” 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1779 (1988).
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of Berger as grounds for placing more extensive limitations on prosecutors’
tactics.
In United States v. Cutler,48 Judge McLaughlin famously cast doubt on
Lord Brougham’s declaration that “the first great duty of an advocate [is] to
reckon everything subordinate to the interests of his client.”49 Judge
McLaughlin favored Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn’s retort that
[t]he arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an
assassin. He ought to uphold the interests of his clients per fas, not per nefas.
He ought to know how to reconcile the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of truth and justice.50

Notwithstanding the aspirational appeal—and at times, the doctrinal relevance—of Chief Justice Cockburn’s response, in most cases, Lord
Brougham’s declaration more closely describes the ethical posture of the
American criminal defense attorney. The duty of a criminal defense attorney
is, indeed, to promote the interests of the client, even, when necessary, at the
expense of broader interests of truth and justice.51
Of course, there are cases in which a criminal defense attorney is faced
with an actual conflict between the duty to the client and other ethical obligations. Judge McLaughlin characterized Bruce Cutler as “a defense lawyer
torn between his duties to act as an officer of the court and to zealously
defend his client.”52 Still, whatever the merits of Judge McLaughlin’s conclusion that Cutler’s conduct was unethical, the opinion seems more generally
to blur the lines between the roles of criminal defense attorneys and other
private lawyers—as well as the very different obligations of prosecutors and
criminal defense attorneys. Anticipating that the court’s decision “will elicit
thunderbolts that we are chilling effective advocacy,”53 Judge McLaughlin
insisted that “[t]he advocate is still entitled—indeed encouraged—to strike
hard blows, but not unfair blows.”54
48 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995).
49 Id. at 841 (alteration in original).
50 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). On the duty of criminal defense attorneys, Justice White
wrote:
Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its
proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light, regardless of what [counsel] thinks or knows to be the truth. . . . [M]ore often than not, defense counsel
will cross-examine. . .and impeach [a prosecution witness] . . . even if [counsel]
thinks the witness is telling the truth . . . . In this respect, as part of our modified
adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense
counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if
any, relation to the search for truth.
Id. at 257–58.
52 Cutler, 58 F.3d at 840.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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For all of its eloquence, Judge McLaughlin’s articulation of the bounds
of ethical advocacy is problematic. Without attribution, Judge McLaughlin
paraphrased Justice Sutherland’s admonition that prosecutors not strike foul
blows, not only applying this principle to private attorneys, but extending the
prohibition on “unfair blows” to include criminal defense attorneys as well.55
If Judge Kozinski’s “well within the rules” standard was questionable for
employing Justice Sutherland’s admonition to place constraints on appropriate prosecutorial tactics that are within the bounds of ethical rules, Judge
McLaughlin’s standard is even more troubling for applying Justice Sutherland’s admonition as a basis for placing constraints on the criminal defense
attorney’s zealous advocacy. Although all attorneys are prohibited from ethical misconduct, if Justice Sutherland’s admonition—delineating the unique
duty of prosecutors not to strike foul blows—means anything, it must be read
as applicable only to prosecutors, not to private attorneys, and certainly not
to criminal defense attorneys.
CONCLUSION
There are undoubtedly drawbacks to implementing an adversarial system. As Bob Rodes and others have suggested,56 there may be considerable
traction to the notion that private lawyers should adopt an ethical approach,
beyond that prescribed under current law, premised on the broader goal of
seeking justice. Likewise, some have argued that prosecutors should more
extensively protect the rights and interests of criminal defendants, beyond
the requirements and expectations of current ethical doctrine.57 Notwithstanding the appeal of such aspirations, these proposals run contrary to the
roles of lawyers within the American system of justice.
Perhaps, as some have suggested, paraphrasing Winston Churchill’s
famous quip about democracy, the adversarial system is the worst form of
justice, except for all of the others.58 In any event, for better or for worse,
and for the foreseeable future, American lawyers will continue to function
within an adversarial system, consisting of both prosecutors, who have a duty
to seek justice—including the duty to convict deserving criminals, and private
lawyers, with a duty to represent the interests of their clients. Accordingly,
55 Id. Indeed, Judge McLaughlin seems to acknowledge this blurring of the lines
between the different roles of attorneys, stating further: “Trial practice, whether criminal
or civil, is not a contact sport. And, its tactics do not include eye-gouging or shin-kicking.”
Id.
56 See, e.g., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Forming an Agenda—Ethics and Legal Ethics, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 977 (2002); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Government Lawyers, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
281 (2000); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Lawyers and Moral Discernment, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
259 (2007).
57 See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1537–38 (1981).
58 Winston S. Churchill, Speech Before the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 7563, 7566 (Robert R.
James ed., 1974).
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judges should take care to employ rhetoric that acknowledges and serves to
promote, rather than undermine, the proper roles of lawyers within the
American justice system.

